“They said Tigray would be strong, and independent. But despite sacrificing so much, we are still poor – starving.”
More than two years after a cessation of hostilities ended a brutal civil war, Ethiopia’s Tigray region should be well along the road to recovery. Instead, its ruling Tigray People’s Liberation Front Party (TPLF) is embroiled in a bitter internal spat that has paralysed politics and sparked fears of fresh conflict.
The dispute pits a faction led by TPLF chairman and wartime leader Debretsion Gebremichael against another helmed by TPLF deputy chairman, Getachew Reda, who signed the November 2022 cessation of hostilities in Pretoria and now leads the interim regional administration created by the deal.
Debretsion’s side accuses Getachew’s interim administration of selling out Tigray’s interests and mishandling the implementation of the peace deal, which was meant to see the return of displaced people, the full withdrawal of Eritrean and Amhara forces from Tigray’s territory, and fresh elections. None of these things have happened.
Getachew and his allies, on the other hand, portray themselves as democratisers – on a mission to open up Tigray’s politics and implement the ceasefire deal – and accuse Debretsion’s group of thwarting them at every turn.
“Getachew aspires to better democracy, whereas Debretsion represents the status quo,” said Woldeselassie Woldemichael, one of Getachew’s senior advisors. “Getachew is consistently on the side of the Pretoria agreement. Debretsion wants to suspend Pretoria and use it as a political tool by placing obstacles to implementation and then saying it’s Getachew’s fault.”
Debretsion’s faction, which controls the party apparatus, firmly denies this.
To outsiders, the dispute can appear esoteric, featuring a soup of acronyms and internal party procedures. But its consequences are far-reaching. Nearly one million people in Tigray remain stuck in improvised displacement camps, sustained by ever-diminishing trickles of aid. Although Tigray is peaceful, malnutrition rates are at emergency levels, hundreds of thousands of children are out of school, and much of its health system still lies in tatters.
“The schism has crippled the whole bureaucracy, and that’s impacting aid delivery, health, education, infrastructure, and the overall well-being of the Tigray society,” said Abel Abate, a researcher at Chatham House.
When a group of senior military commanders denounced the interim administration and called for its overhaul in late January, Getachew called it a coup d’état. The sharp escalation prompted panic among Tigray’s population.
Last month, Getachew warned, “we are heading towards a cliff edge” and conflict could erupt “any minute”. A broad range of mediators – from Tigray’s clergy to Western diplomats – has attempted to heal the rift, without success, as competition to control Tigray’s gold mines and state-owned enterprises heats up.
“The genesis of the split”
The Pretoria agreement sits at the heart of the dispute. At his heavily guarded compound in Mekelle, Tigray’s capital, Debretsion describes it as “the genesis of the split”.
Getachew’s negotiating team was dispatched to Pretoria as fierce battles raged in Tigray with one assignment: “To just stop the fighting – no more, no less”, Debretsion told The New Humanitarian.
Instead, under pressure from the federal government, the team agreed to a much broader deal that dissolved Tigray’s regional government, outlined an unrealistically fast timeline for Tigray’s disarmament, and described parts of Tigray occupied by Amhara forces as “contested territories”.
“The whole terms were dictated by the federal government. We told our team, ‘You are simply accepting orders, not negotiating,’” said Debretsion.
Shortly after the deal was signed, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said he got “100%” of what he wanted, while other members of the TPLF have said that Tigray was losing the war and had no option other than to accept subservient terms.
Although his opponents accuse him of seeking to undermine the Pretoria deal, which he describes as “good and bad”, Debretsion insisted he is committed to its implementation: “Once you have an agreement, you execute the spirit and words of the agreement. We should still honour it.”
Whether or not Tigray’s negotiators could have secured a better deal, the main sticking point now driving the TPLF apart is the failure to return home nearly one million displaced people – a key part of the Pretoria agreement.
Most of these displaced people come from western Tigray, a fertile area known for its gold and sesame production that was seized by forces from the neighbouring Amhara region, who have long claimed it as their own.
The Pretoria agreement did not deal directly with the fate of western Tigray and other areas but committed the parties to “resolving issues of contested areas in accordance with the Constitution”. Abiy has said this means a referendum. But the TPLF insists the displaced people must return before any vote.
The TPLF also insists, in line with the peace deal, that Amhara forces – and Eritrean soldiers in border areas – must withdraw before Tigray’s fighting force disarms, and on the creation of a safe environment for IDP returns. The same applies for elections, another key Pretoria clause, the TPLF says.
Debretsion’s TPLF faction blames Getachew’s interim administration for failing to pressure the federal government into ordering the withdrawal of Amhara forces. “If PM [Abiy] wanted to, he could place a call and it’s done,” said Abraham Tekeste, a Debretsion ally who is on the TPLF executive committee.
Yet the continued presence of Amhara forces in western Tigray probably benefits Abiy, who is battling another insurgency in the Amhara region. This conflict would be inflamed further if he returned the territory to Tigray. The failure to send the displaced people home also keeps Tigray divided and thus easier to control, some analysts suggest.
Who is the TPLF?
Another key sticking point is the refusal of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) to reinstate the TPLF as a political party. During the war, NEBE suspended the TPLF and parliament proscribed it as a terror group.
That terror designation has been rescinded, but the dispute over the TPLF’s legal status continues, with NEBE suspending the TPLF again last month.
Amid the dispute, the TPLF went ahead with a party Congress in August where it suspended Getachew and his allies. Getachew’s faction branded the Congress as illegal. In October, the Debretsion’s faction upped the ante further by demanding that Getachew and his allies step down from the interim government.
“We can’t allow these individuals to be in TPLF positions,” Debretsion told The New Humanitarian. “They are free to abandon the party, go their own way, and form another party, but they don’t represent us, so they have to vacate their positions and we will assign another [set of officials].”
Pro-Debrestion cadres now portray the TPLF as “a party in opposition”, saying it has nothing to do with the decisions of the interim administration.
According to Kindeya Gebrehiwot, a senior member of the interim administration who was among those expelled from the TPLF in October, this characterisation is disingenuous. “The rift is within the TPLF, not between the TPLF and the interim administration,” he said. “There are deep divisions. We have people who are resisting the cessation of hostilities agreement, especially at the local level.”
The possibility of a civil war between Tigrayan factions is unlikely. “We’ve seen enough pain and suffering, no one wants to fight again,” explained a well-placed Tigray official, who asked to remain anonymous to speak freely.
Regional dynamics
Over the last 18 months, Abiy has launched a campaign to reclaim landlocked Ethiopia’s sea access, which it lost when Eritrea seceded in 1993. This prompted an angry row with Somalia that has only just been patched up.
It has also ratcheted up tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which mobilised reservists below the age of 60 years and increased security along its southern border in February. Any conflagration between the two would inevitably drag in Tigray, which shares decades of bad blood and a 1,000-kilometre border with Eritrea.
“I don’t like either side. They are not working for the public. They are just struggling for their power.”
Added to this is a swirl of rumours that senior Tigray military commanders met recently with Eritrean dictator Isaias Afwerki in January – claims they deny.
“We have to resolve the rift peacefully,” said Kindeya, “but the regional dynamics are very fraught – maybe it will be out of our control.”
For many, the TPLF is more than a political party.
“Our mums, dads, and uncles fought in the TPLF since the 1970s, first against the communist regime [known as the Derg], then Eritrea, and then against the federal government,” said another Tigray official. “It’s an institution close to our hearts, a huge political movement.”
Yet the absence of a peace dividend after a devastating war that killed roughly 600,000 people has badly damaged the TPLF’s legitimacy.
One young man who fought in the recent conflict told The New Humanitarian how he no longer supports the party, which he sees as a venal elite ready to plunge Tigray back into conflict to preserve its interests.
“I don’t like either side. They are not working for the public. They are just struggling for their power,” he said. “They said Tigray would be strong, and independent. But despite sacrificing so much, we are still poor – starving.”
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